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Risk Management Techniques for Agricultural Cooperatives:  





While not ignoring risk, agricultural cooperatives tend to accommodate risk through the holding 
of internal capital reserves rather than engage in active risk management.  A lack of information 
regarding the risk, returns, and the effect on cooperative financial performance of both 
traditional and innovative risk management strategies is likely a constraint to the adoption of 
active risk management by cooperatives.  In this research, we examine the influence of 
alternative risk management strategies on cooperative financial performance, namely the return 
on assets (ROA) of grain merchandising cooperatives of various sizes.  Strategies include 
traditional exchange traded futures and options strategies, an over-the-counter revenue swap, 
throughput insurance, and combinations of price and throughput strategies.  Each of these 
strategies, for small, medium, and large size firms, are evaluated using a range of procedures 
including techniques which rely on mean-variance efficiency as well as evaluation procedures 
which help determine the ability of a strategy to mitigate downside risk.  The results of the 
simulation exercise provide considerable support for the routine buying of at-the-money put 
options in setting a commodity floor price.  The results also support the use, and perhaps the 
development, of insurance on cooperative throughput if the insurance product is used in 
conjunction with a price risk management strategy, in essence providing a hedge against 
downfalls in revenue.  Over-the-counter revenue swaps, while intuitively appealing, did not 
perform well on average relative to more traditional exchange traded products.  This result is 
especially important given the added counterparty risk associated with such contracts.  
However, in some cases, the revenue swap, as well routine hedging with futures, performed 
better under a Value-at-Risk evaluation criteria than with a mean-variance criteria.  Hence, it is 
important for cooperative managers to consider these results in the context of the risk 





Agricultural cooperatives, like all agribusinesses, operate in an inherently risky environment.  
While many investor owned agribusinesses have embraced both the use of traditional (e.g., 
futures and options) and innovative risk management tools (e.g., swaps and other over-the-
counter instruments), agricultural cooperatives, especially smaller, regional cooperatives with 
commodity specific focuses, have been slower in their adoption of modern risk management 
practices.  While certainly not ignoring risk, most cooperatives have chosen a path of risk 
accommodation, in particular through the holding of internal capital reserves, versus that of 
active risk management.  This practice, however, is particularly costly for cooperative members 
since coops tend to be relatively capital constrained due to their lack of access to public equity 
markets and their requirement to eventually pay out all earnings (Richards and Manfredo).  Thus, 
capital tied up in non-productive uses can be expensive, particularly during times of high interest 
rates.  As well, given the recent period of low commodity prices, many cooperatives are now 
experiencing a greater need for efficient risk management tools and practices.  While both  2
traditional and innovative risk management tools provide cooperative managers opportunities to 
augment their risk exposure, and subsequently the risk exposure of their members, managers 
often avoid these tools due to lack of information regarding their risk-return characteristics.  
Since this lack of information is likely to be a constraint, research and communication should aid 
in the adoption of active risk management and eventually improved financial performance for 
agricultural cooperatives.   
 
Therefore, the objective of this research is to compare and rank several alternative risk 
management techniques according to their ability to provide an optimal risk-return tradeoff for 
US agribusiness enterprises.  Specifically, this research conducts simulations on how various risk 
management tools and strategies influence the ultimate financial performance of grain 
merchandising cooperatives of different size based on total coop revenue.  In doing this, we 
focus on several traditional and innovative strategies including futures and options hedges, an 
over-the-counter revenue swap, an insurance product to protect against shortfalls in coop 
throughput, as well as combinations of these strategies.  A variety of metrics are also used in 
evaluating these strategies.  Broadly, the set of metrics used include a ranking based on expected 
return only, Value-at-Risk (VaR), the Sharpe Ratio, and a stochastic dominance measure. Using 
this spectrum of evaluation procedures (Gloy and Baker) helps to examine these risk 
management procedures under both simple, intuitive metrics (e.g., VaR) as well as traditional 
mean-variance measures (e.g., the Sharpe Ratio and stochastic dominance).  Further, if there is 
strong agreement in the rankings implied by each of these measures, this will provide evidence 
as to the superiority of one risk management strategy relative to another.   
 
 
Data and Methods 
 
To evaluate alternative risk management strategies, and how they influence the financial 
performance of cooperatives of different size, a stochastic simulation exercise is conducted using 
the @RISK simulation software ad-in for Microsoft Excel.  The following section explains the 
methodology, assumptions, and data requirements needed for conducting these simulations.  
Specifically, we describe 1) the development of representative coop financial statements for 
cooperatives of different size, 2) the determination of risk factors to model in a stochastic 
simulation framework, 3) the specific risk management strategies employed, and 4) the 




Data provided by Co-Bank are used in creating representative income statements for grain 
merchandising cooperatives of different size.  The Co-Bank data contain financial information of 
cooperatives that borrow from Co-Bank.  These data are used to fulfill required loan 
documentation, and are also used in developing internal credit scoring models.  These data are 
self-reported by the cooperatives to Co-Bank.  Cooperative names are not identified in the 
database.  The data span the time period from 1992 to 2002, and reflect an unbalanced panel in 
that some firms do not report every year and/or drop out of the database.  All data are annual 
financial data commonly found in a firm’s income statement and balance sheet.  Given that most 
firms have different fiscal years, the financial statement data are not uniform in when they are  3
reported.  For grain merchandising cooperatives (SIC 5153), the quantity of cooperative 
throughput for major commodities sold are also reported for most firms.  Thus, in building the 
representative cooperatives, only firms which reported quantity numbers are used.  
 
Three sizes of grain merchandising cooperatives are examined, with the size categories 
determined by total revenue for the firm:  total revenue less than $10 million, total revenue 
between $10 million and $50 million, and total revenue greater than $50 million.  The income 
statements (abbreviated), the average throughput for major commodities (corn, wheat, and 
soybeans), and total assets are shown for each of the cooperative size categories in Tables 1 and 
Table 2.  For each of the financial variables, and for the quantity numbers, these data reflect the 
numbers for an “average firm” in that size class.  Note, given that we construct the income 
statements for the average firm, we assume that the average grain cooperative markets all three 
of the major grain commodities: corn, wheat, and soybeans commensurate with the average 
quantity marketed by all firms in the panel.
1 
 
In determining how various risk management strategies effect financial performance, we focus 
on the Return on Assets defined as Local Savings / Total Assets.  In essence, Local Savings is 
the same as Earnings Before Taxes (EBT) for investor owned firms, and provides an indication 
of profitability of the cooperative before the inclusion of patronage income and other income and 
expense categories.  Hence, ROA as defined here more appropriately reflects the operating 
performance of the cooperative.  Furthermore, given that ROA is expressed in a percentage form, 
it is a measure that is easy to compare across firm sizes, and accommodates the evaluation 
procedures where a return measure is needed (e.g., Sharpe’s Ratio).   
 
 
Stochastic Simulation Using @RISK  
 
Stochastic simulation is used to determine how various risk management procedures effect 
financial performance measures of grain merchandising cooperatives of different size.  
Specifically, we use the @RISK add-in software (Palisade Corporation).
2  @RISK allows the 
modeler to specify certain input variables as stochastic.  Monte Carlo simulation techniques are 
then used to draw observations from the designated input distributions.  The simulation is 
conducted many times, in this case 5,000 times, and the distribution of the output variables of 
interest are examined (e.g., ROA).   
 
To best illustrate how this stochastic simulation works, it is necessary to first describe the cash 
only (benchmark) strategy used.  Here, the cash only strategy assumes that no risk management 
takes place, and that the cooperative sells their respective throughput solely in the cash market.  
Referring to Table 1, Sales of Commodities and Grain (Sales_Commod) is modeled as:  
 
                                                 
1 It may be the case, due to geography, that a grain merchandising cooperative has a more limited scope in the grain 
marketed than the diversified grain cooperative presented.  For instance, a grain merchandising cooperative in 
Kansas may only market wheat and not soybeans and corn.   
2 Another well-known program, Crystal Ball, allows for the modeling of stochastic input variables in a spreadsheet 
framework and is a major competitor to the @RISK program.    4
(1)   Sales_Commod = (Cash Corn Price) x (Bu. Corn Sold) + (Cash Wheat Price) x 
(Bu. Wheat Sold) + (Cash Soybean Price) x (Bu. Soybeans Sold)  . 
 
Subsequently, the cash prices for corn, wheat, and soybeans (commodity i) are defined in the 
model as:  
 
(2)  Cash Price (i) = Nearby Futures (i) + Nearby Basis (i) .    
The nearby futures and nearby basis are defined as stochastic inputs in @RISK, which ultimately 
makes the cash prices stochastic as well.  In determining an appropriate distribution to use for 
nearby futures and nearby basis in the simulation, the Best Fit program is used.  Best Fit 
performs as series of goodness-of-fit tests and ranks how well alternative distributions fit the 
appropriate input data.  The data used here are weekly (Wednesday) nearby futures for corn, 
wheat, and soybeans from the Chicago Board of Trade (CRB/Bridge Database) from 1980 to 
2001.  As well, in estimating the appropriate nearby basis distribution, cash prices are needed.  
The cash markets for corn and soybeans are Central Illinois (#2 yellow corn and #1 yellow 
soybeans respectively), and the cash market for wheat is St. Louis (#2 soft red).  These data are 
also included in the CRB/Bridge Database, and are the same as the cash prices reported daily in 
the Wall Street Journal. The cash data also reflect Wednesday prices from 1980 to 2001.  In 
fitting distributions for nearby futures and basis, the time period of historical data used here is 
important.  During this time period, prices for all commodities realized both extreme highs (e.g., 
1995/1996) and extreme lows (e.g., 1999/2000).  While basis conditions certainly vary due to 
geography, the use of these cash prices are still useful in modeling basis, and help in the 
consideration of basis risk in simulating the futures and options strategies.  Ultimately, the 
simulation could be modified to reflect local conditions by using local cash data to model basis.     
Coop throughput of these commodities is also variable, and this variability of throughput could 
definitely influence the distribution of coop revenue and ultimately ROA.  Given this, coop 
throughput for each commodity (i) is modeled as:  
(3)  Bu. Sold (i) = Average Bu. Sold (i) x (1+% Difference from National Average 
Utilization (i)),  
where the Average Bu. Sold (i) reflects the average coop throughput for a given commodity as 
calculated from the Co-Bank data.  Equation (3) also assumes that the Bu. Sold (i) varies with 
the national utilization of the commodity.  Hence, an input distribution for utilization of each 
commodity is fitted to its respective national historical utilization data.  This annual utilization or 
disappearance data is taken from the ERS Feed Grain Yearbook (Corn), ERS Wheat Yearbook, 
ERS Oilseeds Yearbook, and various issues of the ERS Agricultural Outlook publication for the 
years 1980 – 2001.  From this data, average utilization is calculated, and subsequently, with each 
draw from the utilization distribution defined, the percent difference from the national average 
utilization is calculated.    5
We also consider the correlation relationships between grain prices, grain production, and 
utilization.
3  For instance, if there is large production in a particular crop year, lower prices are 
likely to be realized and visa-versa.  @RISK has the capability to correlate variables within the 
simulation.  For example, when @RISK makes random draws from both the corn price and corn 
production distributions, the price and production numbers will be drawn such that this 
correlation holds.  The ability to correlate these key variables brings considerable reality to the 
model, and also takes into consideration the “natural hedge” that takes place when low (high) 
production and high (low) prices are realized.  While the data used in fitting the price and 
utilization distributions have already been described, the data used to fit the production 
distributions for each commodity are taken from USDA/NASS Crop Reports Track Record 
Database for 1980-2001.  Table 3 shows the correlation matrix used in the @RISK simulation.
4  
 
Finally, it is necessary to consider how the Cost of Sales of Commodities and Grain 
(COG_Commod) behaves in the simulation.  Here, we assume that COG_Commod will vary 
with coop throughput given that costs of goods sold reflect variable costs which are tied to the 
volume of throughput.  To model the changes in COG_Commod with coop throughput, the 
percentage change in average coop throughput is calculated and multiplied by average 
COG_Commod in the income statement such that:  
 
(4)   COG_Commod =  Avg. COG_Commod x (1+% difference from average coop 
throughput).   
 
For example, for grain marketing cooperatives with total revenue less than $10 million, the 
average coop throughput (all grains combined) is 2,125,298 bushels.  When the @RISK 
simulation is run, based on the utilization distributions, coop throughput for each commodity will 
change, and subsequently total coop throughput will change.  If total coop throughput on a 
particular iteration is 2,000,000 bushels, then the % change from the average throughput would 
be – 5.9%: (2,000,000 –2,125,298)/2,125,298.  This provides a direct relationship between 
changes in coop throughput and changes in the cost of goods sold for commodities 
(COG_Commod).  For the cash only strategy presented, when a simulation is run, it is possible 
that Sales_Commod is quite high, but COG_Commodities is low during a particular iteration.  
This would reflect the unique occurrence of both low coop throughput (thus low variable costs) 
and high commodity prices.  Ultimately, this phenomenon will be captured in the distribution of 
Gross Margin, Operating Profit, and Local Savings, which are additive entries in the income 
statement (Table 1).   
 
Risk Management Strategies  
 
The cash only strategy described above is used as the baseline strategy in comparing the effects 
of alternative risk management strategies on the distribution of cooperative ROA.  The following 
risk management strategies are examined, and described in more detail below: 1) routine and 
                                                 
3 Given that utilization was used as the stochastic variable driving the changes in throughput of commodities, we 
also included utilization in the correlation matrix.  However, national grain prices and national grain production are 
likely to have more significant correlations.   
4 Note: in defining the correlation matrix, average yearly cash prices for grain as reported by USDA/NASS are used 
instead of nearby futures prices to be consistent with the yearly data used for commodity utilization and production.   6
selective hedging with futures, 2) routine and selective purchasing of at-the-money put options to 
establish a floor price for a commodity, 2) an over-the-counter revenue swap, 4) throughput 
insurance, and 5) combinations of price and insurance strategies.   
 
Futures Strategy   
 
A grain marketing cooperative can manage price risk of their throughput using a straight futures 
market hedge by taking a short position in the futures market (selling futures).  Although this 
strategy can theoretically lock in a selling price for grain, the cooperative is still subject to 
considerable basis risk if the cash-futures price relationship changes significantly from when the 
hedge is set to when the hedge is lifted.  In the simulation, the futures hedge is modeled as: 
 
(5)    Final Price Received (i) = Cash Price (i)  + [Beginning Futures Price (i) – Ending Futures 
Price (i)].   
 
So, the “cash price” of commodity (i) in equation (1) is replaced by the “final price received” in 
equation (5) when the futures hedge is simulated in @RISK.  Again, as was shown with the cash 
only strategy, cash price is defined as futures (ending) + basis.  Also, there are separate 
distributions defined for both beginning and ending futures.  Therefore, when a simulation is 
conducted, the futures price drawn from “beginning futures price” and “ending futures price” are 
independent, so there will be either a decrease or increase in futures price of “ending futures” 
relative to “beginning futures”.   
 
Two different futures strategies are examined.  First, a routine futures hedging strategy is 
simulated such that a short position is taken in “beginning futures” regardless of the price that 
@RISK pulls from the “beginning futures” distribution.  Second, a selective hedging strategy is 
examined where a short position is established only if the beginning futures price is greater than 
or equal to the long-run average nearby futures price over the sample period 1980 – 2001 (corn = 
$2.61/bu., wheat = $3.51/bu, and soybeans = $6.28/bu).  The routine futures strategy is named 




The option strategy simulated is a simple put option strategy (purchasing an at-the-money put 
option).  The purchasing of put options allows the cooperative to hedge against price declines, 
but allows the cooperative to take advantage of gains in the cash price if realized.  Still, the 
cooperative can be exposed to considerable basis risk which can greatly influence the final price 
received with an options hedge.  Equation (6) defines the final price received using this put 
option strategy (buying a put).  
 
(6)       if Strike (i) > Ending Futures (i), then:  
 
Final Price Received (i) = Cash Price (i) + (Strike(i) – Ending Futures(i)) – Option 
Premium (i)  
 
and,   7
 
if Strike (i) <= Ending Futures (i), then:  
 
Final Price Received (i) = Cash price (i) – Option Premium (i) 
 
where again (i) denotes the commodity of interest (corn, wheat, or soybeans).    
Option premiums are simulated using Financial Cad (FinCad).  FinCad is a spreadsheet ad-in 
program which allows for the pricing of a number of financial derivative products.  Specifically, 
we use the Black-1976 model for estimating premiums for options on futures contracts.  The 
inputs into this option pricing formula include the strike price, the underlying futures price, the 
time to expiration, the risk-free rate of interest, and the volatility of the underlying futures price.    
Since the risk-free rate of interest has a very minor influence on option premiums, it is set at a 
fixed 3%, which is reasonably consistent with today’s interest rate environment.  The volatility 
used is the average annualized historical volatility of nearby futures prices from 1980 to 2001.  
This historical volatility data is taken from the Chicago Board of Trade and is available for each 
commodity (corn = 0.17, wheat = 0.202, soybeans = 0.187).  Furthermore, we allow the time to 
expiration to be stochastic in the simulation, ranging anywhere from 14 to 250 days to 
expiration.  This provides for varying values of the option premium, and thus allows us to make 
more general statements about the efficacy of option strategies given that we do not designate a 
specific time horizon for any of the hedging strategies examined, unlike what would be done for 
a pre-determined, pre-harvest strategy that an individual producer might engage in (AgRisk; 
Gloy and Baker).   
As with the futures strategies above, we allow for the routine purchase of puts (Put Options) and 
also establish a trading rule where put options are only purchased if the strike price is greater 
than the long-run average nearby futures price (Put Options – TR).  All put options are “at-the-
money”, where the strike price is equal to the beginning futures.  
Revenue Swap  
 
The next strategy examined involves an over-the-counter revenue swap between the grain 
merchandising cooperative and an end-user of the commodity.  These two counterparties’ 
economic interests are nearly exactly opposite, so are naturals to enter into an agreement to offset 
each other’s losses in the event of a revenue shortfall caused by variability in prices and/or 
volume of grain marketed.  
 
The revenue swap is structured as follows.  First, it is assumed that the two parties agree upon a 
set amount of commodity to be marketed, along with a set price, where the amount of 
commodity marketed is equal to average coop throughput and the price is equal to the long-run 
average price.  This establishes a benchmark value for revenue.  When a simulation is run in 
@RISK, if the actual prices and/or throughput cause revenue to fall below the benchmark value, 
then the end-user will pay an amount equal to the shortfall to the cooperative.  However, if 
throughput and/or prices rise such that the cooperative has more revenue than expected, the 
cooperative will compensate the end user the difference between the two.  This transaction 
essentially locks in both the end-user’s cost and the cooperative’s revenue.  The revenue for a 
particular commodity (i) under the revenue swap is:   8
 
(7) Revenue (i) =  Cash Price (i) x Bu. Sold (i) + [Benchmark Value – (Cash Price (i) x Bu. Corn 
Sold (i))] .  
 
The revenue swap strategy is appropriately named Revenue Swap in Tables 5 through 7.   
 
 
Throughput Insurance  
 
The insurance product used here is modeled after the Group Risk Plan (GRP) area-yield 
insurance offered by the Risk Management Agency (RMA).  While government sponsored yield 
risk insurance products are only available to farmers at this time, it is assumed that this type of 
insurance product is available to cooperatives, or that cooperatives can offer a federally 
sponsored production insurance contract to all their members.  For the simulation, insurance 
premiums are taken from the RMA website for Effingham County, Illinois.  Effingham County is 
chosen since GRP insurance is offered for corn, wheat, and soybeans in this county, and it is 
located in a major grain producing region of the Midwest.  The GRP insurance information used 
is effective as of July 2001 and is shown in table.
5    
 
The following assumptions are necessary such that the characteristics of the GRP program are 
meaningful in the context of a cooperative.  Using corn for the small cooperative (less than $10 
million in total revenue) as an example, average coop throughput is converted into “average 
equivalent coop acres” by taking average coop throughput for corn (1,333,496 bu) and dividing 
by the expected county yield for Effingham County (120.3 bu) which yields 11,085 acres.   
Second, the guaranteed amount must be calculated.  Assuming 100% protection of the maximum 
protection level (100% of $406.1), the guaranteed amount is $4,501,519 ($406.1 x 11,085 acres).  
Third, the premium is calculated by taking the guaranteed amount and multiplying it by the base 
premium for the desired yield election.  Assuming a 90% yield election, the premium is 
$256,587 ($4,401,519 x 0.057).  Assuming that the premiums are subsidized, the subsidy is 
calculated taking the subsidy factor for the desired yield election (0.55 for the 90% level) and 
multiplying it by the premium.  Thus, the premium subsidy is $141,123 ($256,587 x 0.55).  In 
other words, for the 90% yield election, the premiums are 55% subsidized.  Given this, the total 
premium paid for this insurance contract is effectively $115,464 ($256,587  - $141,123).  Taking 
the effective premium of $115,464 and dividing by the average equivalent coop acres (11,085) 
gives the premium per acre of $10.42, which matches the RMA premium per acre for Effingham 
County for the 90% yield election and 100% protection level.   
An indemnity is paid if the realized coop throughput on an “equivalent acre basis” is less than 
the yield guarantee.  The yield guarantee is calculated as the yield election (90%) times the 
expected county yield (120.3) which is 108.27 bu / acre.  So, if the realized coop throughput per 
acre is less than the yield guarantee, an indemnity (per equivalent coop acre) is paid which is 
equal to the percent yield shortfall, times the percent protection level, times the maximum 
protection level.  The total indemnity would be the indemnity per acre times the average 
equivalent coop acres.  Thus, the total revenue for commodity (i) would be:  
                                                 
5 See the RMA website (http://www.rma.usda.gov/) for updated information on GRP insurance, and for the updated 
premium and subsidy information for Effingham County, IL.    9
(8) Revenue (i) = [Cash Price (i) x Bu. Sold (i)] + Indemnity – Insurance Premium.   
This insurance strategy described above is used for all commodities within the representative 
cooperatives (corn, wheat, and soybeans).  The insurance strategy is aptly named Insurance in 
Tables 5 to 7.   
Combination Strategies  
Strategies that combine both an element of price risk management (e.g., futures and/or options 
hedges) and the above throughput yield insurance scheme are also examined.  In essence, the use 
of both a price hedge and a throughput hedge provides for protection against shortfalls in total 
revenue (Sales_Commod).  The combination strategies examined include routine futures hedging 
and insurance (Futures / Insurance), selective hedging and insurance (Futures – TR / Insurance), 
a routine purchase of put options and insurance (Options / Insurance), and a selective options 
hedging strategy and insurance (Options – TR / Insurance).   
Evaluation Procedures  
 
Similar to the methods employed by Gloy and Baker, each of the outlined risk management 
strategies are evaluated using a unique set of evaluation procedures.  Specifically, the metrics 
used here include 1) the expected return, 2) Value-at-Risk (VaR), 3) the Sharpe Ratio, and 4) 
first degree stochastic dominance with a risk free asset (FDSDRA).  For the expected return 
criteria, strategies are ranked in descending order based on ROA. Hence the strategy yielding the 
largest ROA would be ranked first, and the lowest ROA ranked last.  The VaR measure reflects 
the probability that ROA will not fall below a certain percentage at a given level of confidence.  
Here, we use the VaR at the standard 5% level.  Strategies that produce smaller VaR numbers are 
preferred.  However, VaR only considers a “safety first” measure of risk and not the inherent 
trade-off between risk and return.  However, the Sharpe Ratio is very similar to the common 
coefficient of variation, but is expressed as the average return less the return from a risk-free 
asset over the standard deviation of returns.  For the return on the risk-free asset, we use the 
average 3-month T-bill rate from 1980-2001 which is 4.3% (Source: Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago).  While the Sharpe Ratio provides a simple, powerful comparison criteria, it suffers 
from the usual criticisms of all mean-variance approaches, namely, that is assumes the 
distributions are entirely characterized by their first two moments.  The use of stochastic 
dominance criteria, however, produces a relevant ranking over a broader range of distributional 
assumptions.  Here, we follow Gloy and Baker and use a first degree stochastic dominance 
criteria which incorporates the ability to lend or borrow at the risk-free rate.  With this measure, 
the density of returns (ROA) is evaluated at the risk-free rate (4.3%), with strategies being 
ranked from the lowest value (most preferred alternative) to the highest value (least preferred).  
In other words, one should choose the strategy with the lowest probability of returning at least 
the risk-free rate.   
 
The use of these alternative measures are necessary for several reasons.  First, managers tend to 
hold differing intuitive notions of risk.  While measures based on statistical notions of a 
distribution of returns hold meaning for some (e.g. mean-variance efficiency), others are more 
interested in the probability of a loss.  Second, some measures are easier to calculate and 
ultimately easier to explain to cooperative management and the coop membership.  Third, if  10
there is strong agreement in the rankings implied by each of these measures, then this provides 





For each representative cooperative (small, medium, and large), and for each risk management  
strategy delineated, the @RISK simulation is set at 5,000 iterations.  This provides an adequate 
number of random pulls from the input distributions to provide a meaningful and consistent 
distribution of ROA.  Furthermore, this number of iterations allows the distribution of ROA to be 
exposed to extreme observations of both price (futures and basis) and utilization which appear in 
the input distributions.   
 
The results of these simulations for each of the three cooperative sizes are presented in Tables 5 
to 7 respectively.  Each table contains the strategies examined, and the rankings produced by the 
respective evaluation procedures.  Overall, there is considerable consistency in the rankings of 
the various risk management strategies both across evaluation procedures and across the different 
firm sizes.  Namely, the routine put option strategy (Put Options) ranked first across all 
evaluation procedures and across all firm sizes.  This is an interesting result since the routine 
options strategy under many circumstances would set a very low floor price.  However, in these 
cases, the underlying price would likely rise, and the option would be allowed to expire.  As 
well, there are likely enough observations, through 5,000 simulations, where purchasing at-the-
money puts at historically high strike prices were very beneficial as well, and these contracts 
were likely exercised.  Overall, this finding says a lot about the power of options in managing 
risks.  The Put Options / Insurance strategy and the Futures-TR strategy also performed 
relatively well, ranking usually second or third among evaluation procedures.  The swap strategy 
(Revenue Swap) and the use of throughput insurance alone (Cash Only / Insurance) consistently 
fared poorly across evaluation procedures and firm sizes.  While the revenue swap is a very 
intuitively appealing risk management strategy, it is likely the case that the probability of 
positive basis risk (i.e., basis gains) help to increase the performance of the price hedging 
strategies (e.g., Put Options; Futures – TR) relative to the swap.  With respect to Insurance, the 
relatively poor rankings of this strategy confirm the idea that price risk likely dominates that of 
quantity or throughput risk of grain merchandising cooperatives.  However, the combination 
strategies, in particular Put Options / Insurance, performed very well across firm sizes and 
evaluation procedures.  This result, combined with the overall lackluster performance of the 
revenue swap, suggests that some form of revenue protection is prudent, but that a better form of 
revenue insurance is where price and throughput risks are managed separately.  This finding may 
also bode well for the development of a revenue insurance product for cooperatives.  Also, for 
over-the-counter revenue swaps, the counterparty risk may be very high, which is certainly not 
the case with exchange traded options and subsidized insurance products.   
 
While the majority of results are fairly consistent across evaluation procedures and firm sizes, 
the biggest dichotomy is found in the rankings of the VaR evaluation versus the measures that 
rely on traditional mean-variance efficiency (e.g., Sharpe’s Ratio).  Namely, the performance of 
the revenue swap strategy has a much higher ranking under VaR criteria than under the Sharpe’s 
Ratio and FDSDRA – a result that is fairly consistent across firm sizes.  Across firm size,  11
Revenue Swap has the highest VaR ranking for firms with total revenue between $10 million and 
$50 million (ranked fourth) and is ranked fifth for firms with total revenue greater than $50 
million. However, Revenue Swap still ranks fairly low for coops with total revenue less than $10 
million. This is an interesting result especially considering that larger cooperatives are more 
likely to engage in over-the-counter strategies than small firms.  As well, the performance of 
routine hedging with futures (Futures) improves greatly under VaR evaluation than with the 
mean-variance approaches, with a third place ranking across the differing firm sizes.  However, 
Futures-TR is ranked much lower under VaR criteria for medium size cooperatives while 
ranking consistently between third and fifth across evaluation procedures for the small and large 
cooperatives.  The strategies that consistently finish last using VaR criteria are Cash Only and 
Cash Only / Insurance.  Again, clearly the best performing strategy is that of Put Options and 
Put Options / Insurance using both the VaR ranking as well as the mean-variance evaluation 
approaches.   
 
The two evaluation procedures relying on mean-variance efficiency, Sharpe’s Ratio and 
FDSDRA, provide in essence the same rankings across firm sizes.  However, worth noting are 
the rankings of Put Options / Insurance and Futures-TR / Insurance with these two evaluation 
criteria.  For each firm size, the FDSDRA favors Futures-TR / Insurance (ranked second) over 
Put Options / Insurance which is ranked fourth with FDSRA, but ranked second with Sharpe’s 
Ratio.   
 
One interesting observation, one that really is immaterial with respect to evaluating risk 
management strategies, is the performance of the cash only strategy across firm sizes.  
Interestingly, the performance of small firms is greater than that of large firms based on ROA 
and the Sharpe’s Ratio.  In fact, the Sharpe’s Ratio for the representative small firm, with total 
revenue less than $10 million, was three percentage points better than the representative large 
firm (total revenue greater than $50 million), with the Sharpe’s Ratio of the medium size coop 
falling between the two.  This result is interesting, especially given the perceived economies of 
scale with large cooperatives and their potential to be more diversified in their revenue 
generating activities than smaller cooperatives.  It may also be that while having a large asset 
base, that larger cooperatives are actually less efficient in their asset utilization.   
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
Agricultural cooperatives are responsible for producing and selling billions of dollars of farm 
output and input supplies per year (USDA).  However, many cooperatives have not embraced 
active risk management practices at the same pace as their investor owned competitors, but more 
routinely take a position of risk accommodation through the holding of capital reserves.  A lack 
of understanding of the risks and rewards of alternative risk management tools, both exchange 
traded and over-the-counter tools, and the effect of these strategies on ultimate financial 
performance of cooperatives has also likely been a constraint to the adoption of active risk 
management.   
 
In this research, we specifically examine how various risk management procedures and strategies 
affect the distribution of ROA for grain merchandising cooperatives of different size.  The results 
generally support the use of exchange traded options contracts in establishing a floor price for  12
grain prices, and also support the use of some type of revenue protection specifically through the 
use of exchange traded price risk management instruments (options and futures) combined with a 
form of throughput insurance.  However, the results are generally not favorable for over-the-
counter revenue swaps, especially in light of the considerable counterparty risk associated with 
these contracts.  It is also found that downside risk evaluation procedures, such as VaR, at times 
provide considerably different rankings for certain risk management strategies than those 
approaches which rely on mean-variance efficiency.  Given this, it is important for cooperative 
managers to carefully consider their risk management objectives when implementing any of the 
described strategies.   
 
Given the importance of agricultural cooperatives in American agriculture, this research provides 
critical information to cooperative managers regarding risk management strategies that may be 
preferred for use in their organizations.  However, this research needs to be expanded to other 
cooperative businesses such as dairy cooperatives.  By using these strategies, coop managers will 
be able to reduce their reliance on internal capital reserves, increase their flexibility in using 
external capital for other productive uses, reduce ownership risk faced by cooperative members, 
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 Table 1.  Representative Income Statements for Grain Merchandising Coops  
 
  
Table 2.  Average Coop Throughput For Coops of Different Size  
> $10 mill
< $10 mill  % of total & < $50 mill  % of total  > $50 mill % of total 
Corn (bu.) 1,333,496 62.7% 3,459,241 55.3% 9,652,574 54.4%
Wheat (bu)  357,500 16.8% 1,773,036 28.3% 4,530,938 25.6%
Soybeans (bu) 434,302 20.4% 1,025,092 16.4% 3,548,767 20.0%
Total (bu) 2,125,298 100.0% 6,257,369 100.0% 17,732,279 100.0%
> $10 mill
DATA CODE  DESCRIPTION  < $10 mill  & < $50 mill  > $50 mill
Sales_Commod Sales Commodities & Grain  $6,930,330 $21,980,741 $64,144,327
Sales_Processed_Gds Sales Processed Goods  4,317 192 2,197
Sales_Supplies Sales Supplies  210,446 629,623 1,671,024
Finance_Rev Finance Company Revenue  0 0 0
Sales_Oth Sales Other  63,734 411,347 5,198,655
Sales_Serv Sales Service Revenue  1,475 5,202 83,946
Sales_Adj Sales Adjustments  1,746 -2,181 5,939
Net Sales  7,208,556 23,029,286 71,094,210
Op_Income Storage and Handling Rev + Other Operating Rev 312,251 888,283 1,941,318
Total Revenue  7,520,807 23,917,569 73,035,528
COG_Commod Cost of Sales Commodities & Grain  6,638,818 21,243,916 61,802,540
COG_Processed_Gds Cost of Sales Processed Goods  0 2,714 1,717
COG_Supplies Cost of Sales Supplies  185,213 506,736 1,490,601
Cost_Funds Cost of Funds Finance Co.  0 0 0
COG_Oth Cost of Sales Other  52,525 334,036 3,940,477
Cost_Serv Cost of Service Revenue  0 973 0
COG_Deprec Cost of Sales Depreciation  0 0 0
COGS 6,876,556 22,088,375 67,235,335
Gross Margin  644,251 1,829,194 5,800,193
Personnel_Exp Personnel Expense + Benefits Expense  217,611 634,333 2,064,934
SGA_Exp Selling, General, and Administrative  90,462 289,663 1,028,614
Oper_Exp Operating Expenses  111,741 280,879 1,021,607
Lease_Exp Lease Rent Expense  4,105 14,108 24,331
Deprec Depreciation and Depletion  94,459 261,839 637,030
Amort Amortization 0 116 431
Total Operating Expenses  518,378 1,480,938 4,776,947
Operating Profit (EBIT) 125,873 348,256 1,023,246
Int_Inc Interest Finance Charge Income  13,307 38,799 163,217
Int_Exp Interest Expense  35,996 112,793 485,841
Profit Before Distribution & Taxes (Local Savings ) $103,184 $274,262 $700,622
Total_Assets Total  Assets  $2,389,882 $6,439,596 $22,157,691
N (observations)  237 353 91
Firms  30 47 14 14
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix of Prices, Production, and Utilization (1980-2001) 


























Corn Price*  1
Wheat Price  0.83999 1
Soybean Price 0.83816 0.73791 1
Corn Production -0.5873 -0.31502 -0.70907 1
Wheat Production  0.17155 0.01356 0.02634 0.1854843 1
Soybean Production  -0.4529 -0.29233 -0.59784 0.8534364 0.0311838 1
Corn Utilization  -0.4031 -0.21113 -0.45694 0.686393 -0.253468 0.867146 1
Wheat Utilization 0.14242 -0.0132 0.21958 -0.251029 0.279241 -0.206959 -0.04833 1
Soybean Utilization -0.4063 -0.24986 -0.50255 0.737404 -0.108447 0.960294 0.899538 -0.12729 1
County: Effingham 
State: IL 
Expected County Yield  120.3
Maximum Protection Level ($/acre)  406.1










 Table 5.  Rankings for Coops with < $10 Million in Total Revenue 
Sharpe's 
Strategy ROA  rank Ratio  rank  VaR @ 5%  rank FDSDRA rank 
Cash Only  0.024 8 -0.034 8 -0.804 10 0.547 8
Futures 0.038 7 -0.012 7 -0.558 3 0.524 7
Put Options  0.238 1 0.455 1 -0.397 1 0.345 1
Revenue Swap  -0.064 11 -0.246 11 -0.776 9 0.610 11
Cash Only / Insurance  -0.006 10 -0.083 10 -0.879 11 0.572 10
Futures / Insurance  0.016 9 -0.064 9 -0.624 8 0.554 9
Put Options / Insurance  0.219 2 0.368 2 -0.469 2 0.389 4
Futures - TR 0.182 4 0.299 4 -0.599 5 0.374 3
Put Options - TR 0.169 5 0.261 5 -0.603 6 0.396 5
Futures - TR / Insurance  0.196 3 0.313 3 -0.590 4 0.364 2
Put Options - TR / Insurance  0.164 6 0.246 6 -0.603 7 0.412 6 16
 
 




Strategy ROA  rank  Ratio  rank  VaR @ 5%  rank  FDSDRA rank 
Cash Only  0.013 8 -0.050 8 -0.879 10 0.551 8
Futures 0.035 7 -0.021 7 -0.582 3 0.533 7
Put Options  0.243 1 0.434 1 -0.420 1 0.353 1
Revenue Swap  -0.089 11 -0.438 11 -0.600 4 0.665 11
Cash Only / Insurance  -0.014 10 -0.086 9 -0.975 11 0.574 9
Futures / Insurance  -0.007 9 -0.115 10 -0.673 9 0.576 10
Put Options / Insurance  0.229 2 0.379 2 -0.476 2 0.379 4
Futures - TR 0.211 3 0.330 4 -0.637 8 0.366 3
Put Options - TR 0.192 5 0.290 5 -0.629 7 0.389 6
Futures - TR / Insurance  0.209 4 0.336 3 -0.613 5 0.353 2
Put Options - TR / Insurance  0.191 6 0.287 6 -0.621 6 0.387 5 17





Strategy ROA  rank Ratio  rank VaR @ 5%  rank FDSDRA rank
Cash Only  0.011 8 -0.064 7 -0.754 10 0.561 8
Futures 0.020 7 -0.070 8 -0.510 3 0.543 7
Put Options  0.198 1 0.402 1 -0.351 1 0.367 1
Revenue Swap  -0.085 11 -0.478 11 -0.543 5 0.677 11
Cash Only / Insurance  -0.010 10 -0.097 9 -0.810 11 0.579 9
Futures / Insurance  -0.004 9 -0.128 10 -0.567 9 0.583 10
Put Options / Insurance  0.181 2 0.329 2 -0.416 2 0.405 4
Futures - TR 0.158 3 0.272 3 -0.531 4 0.394 3
Put Options - TR 0.134 6 0.206 6 -0.566 8 0.423 6
Futures - TR / Insurance  0.152 4 0.259 4 -0.545 6 0.382 2
Put Options - TR / Insurance  0.137 5 0.215 5 -0.549 7 0.423 5